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RECENT DECISIONS
search for any type of object. In Poller Mr. Justice Hand criticized the
''mere evidence rule" stating:
If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make so
much difference what is taken away, since the officers will
ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and
there can be no sound policy in protecting what does. 8
It is clear that confusion in the application of the "mere evidence rule"
led to much criticism of it. Now, with the literal interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment in Hayden the confusion over instrumentalities,
fruits, contraband and "mere evidence" is eliminated. Perhaps an argu-
ment made by the petitioner, but which the court did not mention was a
policy reason for abandoning the "mere evidence rule.' 3 9 This argument
was that in Miranda v. Arizona4 ° the court encouraged the police to place
a heavier emphasis on scientific investigation, and if the ability to seize
evidentiary objects was limited, as it was prior to this case, much
scientific investigation would be frustrated. Thus this decision, logical
and sound in its own right, may also be an attempt to balance the rights
of the accused and the power of the police in the field of evidence and
investigation.
Robert A. Kelly
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH WA.wANTs---Health and Safety Inspec-
tions-The Fourth Amendment guarantees that a person may not be
convicted for refusing to consent to a health or safety inspection of his
residence or place of business to be made without a search warrant.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967). See v. City of
Seattle, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967).
In Camara v. Municipal Court petitioner was convicted for violating the
San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit an inspection of his
residence on two different occasions when no search warrant had been
issued.' Petitioner argued that the ordinance under which he was con-
38. Id.
39. Brief for Appellant at 38, 39, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S Ct.
1642 (1967).
40. 384 U.S. 463 (1966).
1. SAN FRANcIsco, CALIF., MuNi'cIAL CODE § 503; RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Autho-
rized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for
the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the
right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to
perform any duty imposed. upon them by the Municipal Code. § 507 PENALTY FOR VIOLA-
TION. Any person, the owner or his authorized agent who violates, disobeys, omits, neglects,
or refuses to comply with, or who resists or opposes the execution ofany of the provisions
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victed was unconstitutional in that it authorized municipal officers to
enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without porbable
cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code existed therein.
In See v. City of Seattle petitioner was convicted for refusing to allow
a representative of the City of Seattle fire department inspect his locked
commercial warehouse without a warrant. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington in affirming the conviction suggested that the Supreme Court of
the United States "has applied different standards of reasonableness to
searches of dwellings than to places of business,"2 citing Davis v. United
States.
In Camara Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority in a six to
three decision,4 agreed with the first of petitioner's two contentions, that
municipal officers cannot enter a private dwelling without a search war-
rant, by holding that the Fourth Amendment, 5 applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," guarantees
a person the right to insist that a building inspector, before entering his
residence, obtain a warrant to search. 7
In See the majority of the Court (the division was the same as in
Camara) distinguished Davis' and held that the Fourth Amendment
forbids warrantless inspections of commercial structures as well as private
residences."
of this Code, or any order of the Superintendent, the Director of Public Works, or the
Director of Public Health made pursuant to this Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $500.00 or by imprison-
ment, not exceeding six months or by both such fine and imprisonment, unless otherwise
provided in this Code, and shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for every day such
violation, disobedience, omission, neglect or refusal shall continue.
2. 87 S. Ct. 1737, 1739 (1967).
3. 328 U.S. 582 (1945).
4. The majority consisted of Warren, C.J., Fortas, J., Brennan, J., Black, J., White, J.
and Douglas, J. Clark, J. wrote the dissent in which Harlan, J. and Stewart, J. concurred.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State Deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
7. 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730 (1967).
8. In See the Court said, 87 S. Ct. at 1740, that Davis involved the reasonableness of a
particular search of business premises but did not involve a search warrant issue.
9. 87 S. Ct. at 1738-39.
[Vol. 6:65
RECENT DECISIONS
In deciding Camara and See, Frank v. Maryland'° was expressly over-
ruled to the extent that it sanctioned inspections without a warrant. In
discussing health inspections made without a search warrant, the Frank
Court, by a five to four majority, had concluded that the battle for the
rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment was fought on the issue of
the right to be secure from "searches for evidence to be used in criminal
prosecution or for forfeitures."" The Frank Court further said that
municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs "touch at most
upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the four-
teenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion .... ,,12 because
the inspections are merely to determine whether physical conditions exist
which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in local regula-
tory ordinances. The majority in Camara agreed that there is a difference
between health and safety inspections and police searches but disagreed
that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection are
merely "peripheral."'" The majority said that inspections besides posing
"a serious threat to personal and family security ... do in fact jeopardize
'self protection' interests of the property owner."'"
The minority in Camara considered this issue settled by the Frank
decision and stated that they would adhere to that decision and its
reasoning.'5
The change in the Supreme Court's position on petitioner's first argu-
ment in the relatively short time period between Frank and Camara is
not that surprising if an overall view is taken of the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments' evolution since Frank was decided. Approximately
one month after the Frank decision the Court noted probable jurisdiction
in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price'6 which was concerned with the same issue
decided in Frank. In deciding the case the Court, while equally divided,
affirmed a conviction for a refusal to admit an inspector requesting entry
under a statute authorizing general periodic inspections. 7 The four
affirming Justices considered Frank as completely controlling even though
the case before them involved a more restrictive ordinance.' s The dissent-
10. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
11. Id. at 365.
12. Id. at 367.
13. 87 S. Ct. at 1731-32.
14. Id. at 1732.
15. Id. at 1742 (dissenting opinion).
16. 360 U.S. 246 (1959).
17. 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
18. DAYTON (OHIO) CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 806-30(a): The Housing Inspector
is hereby authorized and directed to make inspections to determine the condition of dwell-
ings. . . . For the purpose of making such inspections and upon showing appropriate iden-
tification the Housing Inspector shall have free access to such dwelling . . . at any reasonable
hour for the purpose of such inspection. BALTIMORE (MD.) CITY CODE, art. XII, § 120
1967-1968]
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ing Justices, while distinguishing the case from Frank on a factual basis,1 9
indicated that the majority in Frank had taken a rejected view of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in measuring its application
to the states. This conclusion was derived from the part of the majority
in Frank that did not subscribe to the doctrine of Wolf v. Coloradol° that
the right of privacy against arbitrary intrusions by the police goes to the
core of the Fourth Amendment and is basic to a free society. The Wolf
Court concluded that this basic right is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty and is therefore enforceable against the states through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The observation of the
Eaton dissenters that part of the Frank majority did not subscribe to
this doctrine became evident when the Wolf doctrine was reiterated in
Elkins v. United States2 which was decided the same day that Eaton
was decided. Part of the Frank majority dissented in Elkins."
Subsequent to Eaton the Supreme Court decided two cases of signifi-
cance concerning the Fourth Amendment's application to the states:
Mapp v. Ohio' and Ker v. California.4 The Mapp decision held that all
evidence obtained by a search and seizure in violation of Fourth Amend-
ment prohibitions was inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court.
Ker more fully defined the Fourth Amendment's effect on state and
municipal action by declaring that the standard of reasonableness applied
to searches is the same under the Fourteenth Amendment as under the
Fourth Amendment.
The Mapp and Ker cases more fully defined the Fourth Amendment's
incorporation into the due process clause. These decisions indicated that
the basis of the Frank decision no longer existed since Frank was premised
on the belief that the interest invaded by the warrantless search was not
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Frank Court also vigorously argued from an historical point that
the inspections were designed to make the least possible demand on the
(1950): Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance
exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and
if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination,
he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars.
19. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 270-71 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
Besides the ordinance being more restrictive in Eaton than in Frank, in Eaton the inspectors
made general demands for inspection supported by no particular justification, whereas in
Frank there was a specific demand for inspection which was justified by the surrounding
circumstances.
20. 338 U.S. 251 (1949).
21. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
22. Id. at 237 (dissenting opinion).
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24. 374 U.S. 23 (1962).
[Vol. 6:65
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individual occupant because they were hedged with safeguards.2 5 It is also
evident from the decisions upholding these inspections without warrants
that the state courts imposed a general reasonableness requirement.2 6 The
argument of the practical application of the warrantless inspections is a
strong one, but the majority in Camara stated that the effect of such a
system leaves the occupant subject to the discretion of an inspection of-
ficial, which is precisely what the Court has consistently attempted to
avoid by requiring that a disinterested party warrant the need to search.2
Although the majority in Camara agreed with petitioner's first conten-
tion as stated above, they disagreed with his second contention that war-
rants should issue only when the inspector possesses probable cause to
believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum
standards prescribed by the code being enforced .2  After weighing the
public interest of the inspection programs against the private interest to
be invaded, the majority concluded the area inspections, of the type in-
volved here, were a reasonable search of private property.' The majority
further concluded "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling"' then " 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must
exist .... ,31 (Emphasis Added.)
On this point the minority in Camara voiced a strong protest calling
the majority's standard a "legalistic facade '3 2 and indicating that such
a standard would destroy the integrity of search warrants and degrade
the judicial process which issues them. The minority felt that such a
system will prove costly to the city in the work incident to the issuance
of the warrants, in the waste of time to inspectors and magistrates and
that it will result in annoyance to the public since under a search warrant
the inspector can enter a building whenever he chooses. The minority also
indicated that the majority's limitation on the holding to area inspections
results in destruction of the health and safety inspections as they apply
to individual inspections for specific problems.3"
The significance of the Camara decision lies in the majority's position
that the probable cause to issue a warrant for a health or safety inspection
25. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
26. Givner v. State, 210 Md. 848, 124 A.2d 764 (1956) ; City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337
S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523
(1958), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
27. 87 S. Ct. at 1733.
28. Id. at 1734.
29. Id. at 1735.
30. Id. at 1736.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1745.
33. Id.
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need not meet the traditional requirements of the term as it applies to
police searches. As indicated by the minority, the significance lies in the
effect of such a ruling more so than its rationale. For by the majority's
insistence upon the formal requirements of the Fourth Amendment, tem-
pered by their realization of the necessity of the inspections involved here,
the substantive guarantees of the Fourth Amendment may necessarily be
attenuated. The net effect of a standard of "reasonableness" and "prob-
able cause" as created by the majority may relax or compromise any
effective protection against unreasonable searches afforded by the Fourth
Amendment; for what judicial officer will refuse to acquiesce in the
allegations that "probable cause" exists to issue a warrant for an area
municipal health or safety inspection under such a standard.
John M. Campfield
CRIMINAL LAw-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-The Pennsylvania Superior Court
more explicitly defines an understandingly and intelligently made waiver
of counsel by an accused.
Commonwealth ex rel. Mullins v. Maroney, 209 Pa. Super. 270, 228
A.2d 1 (1967).'
Relator was one of three men accused of armed robbery in Pennsylvania.
He was arrested in Ohio, where he fought extradition, utilizing the ser-
vices of an Ohio attorney. Unsuccessful, he was returned to Pennsylvania
where he pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced. Relator then
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging deprivation of counsel.
In the court below, it was decided that relator had not intelligently waived
counsel, and a new trial was granted. The Commonwealth appealed, and
the superior court, in reversing the decision of the lower court and dis-
missing the petition of habeas corpus, held that the defendant did not
sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the waiver was not understandingly and knowingly made by him.
A fundamental concept in our legal system has been a defendant's right
to counsel. The Bill of Rights is clear on this issue, stating that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 2 In the landmark United States
1. This decision is pending allocature to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, all criminal appeals, with the exception of capital
cases, have their final appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Counsel for the relator,
Edward Klett, Esq., is filing for allocature in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, claiming that
the defendant was deprived of his rights under the Pennsylvania and United States Con-
stitutions. If unsuccessful on appeal or allocature, relator will appeal to the United States
Supreme Court on similar grounds.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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